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I. INTRODUCTION

By granting states “special solicitude in our standing analysis,” the
Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA1 created substantial new

* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings.
** © 2008 by Calvin Massey.
1. 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007). Massachusetts, joined by eleven other states and additional
plaintiffs, challenged the EPA’s denial of a petition to regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases emitted by new cars. Id. at 505. The EPA contended that it lacked statutory authority to
regulate these gases. Id. Massachusetts contended that the EPA was required by the Clean Air Act
to regulate such gases. Id. The threshold issue was whether Massachusetts and its fellow plaintiffs
had standing. Id. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs had standing, that the Clean Air Act
authorized the EPA to regulate the gases in question, and that the EPA was required to do so unless
it could determine that the gases do not contribute to global warming or has some credible reason
why it cannot make that determination. Id. at 534–35.
249
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uncertainty in the law of standing. At least since Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.2
Article III’s limitation of federal jurisdiction to “cases” or “controversies”
has required a litigant to plead and prove actual or imminent personal
injury in fact that is “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct and that
will be redressed by the requested relief.3 This “irreducible constitutional
2. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
3. As an aspect of the Article III case or controversy requirement, standing appears to have
a long pedigree. As early as 1809, in Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. (1 Cranch) 344, 348
(1809), the Court ruled that a dispute concerning title to land did not arise under Jay’s Treaty of
1794, so as to invoke federal jurisdiction, because the litigants’ claims to title were “not affected
by the treaty.” The only person whose title was so affected was not a party. Id. In other words, a
plaintiff needs to assert his own injury to have a “case.” That point was given modern shape in
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923), in which the Court ruled that neither a state
nor a federal taxpayer possessed sufficient injury to challenge the validity of a federal spending
program to promote maternal health. The state’s injury was an
abstract question[] of political power, of sovereignty, of government. No rights of
the state falling within the scope of the judicial power have been brought within
the actual or threatened operation of the statute, and this court is . . . without
authority to pass abstract opinions upon the constitutionality of acts of
Congress . . . .
Id. at 485. The taxpayer’s injury—taxation to support an allegedly unconstitutional program—was
insufficient to constitute a case or controversy because it was “shared with millions of others, [was]
comparatively minute and indeterminable, and the effect upon future taxation [was] . . . remote,
fluctuating and uncertain.” Id. at 487. Neither plaintiff was “able to show [that it had] . . . sustained
or [was] immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury”; all they could demonstrate was
they “suffer[ed] in some indefinite way in common with people generally.” Id. at 488. The other
side of the coin was that the presence of such personal injury gave rise to a presumption of
standing. For example, in Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309–10 (1944), the Court concluded that
milk producers affected by a marketing order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture had alleged
sufficient personal financial injury to possess standing:
When . . . definite personal rights are created by federal statute . . . the silence of
Congress as to judicial review is . . . not to be construed as a denial of authority
to the aggrieved person to seek appropriate relief in the federal courts in the
exercise of their general jurisdiction . . . . [U]nder Article III, Congress established
courts to adjudicate cases and controversies as to claims of infringement of
individual rights whether by unlawful action of private persons or by the exertion
of unauthorized administrative power.
But standing was always an implied aspect of a case or controversy. When serving in the House
of Representatives, John Marshall declared that the case or controversy requirement in Article III
limited federal jurisdiction to
a controversy between parties which had taken a shape for judicial decision. If the
judicial power extended to every question under the constitution it would involve
almost every subject proper for legislative discussion and decision; if to every
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minimum”4—injury in fact, causation, and redressability—establishes the
core of standing.5 As limits upon the federal judicial power, these elements
necessarily apply to all litigants. After EPA, however, the meaning of these
elements vary with the litigant and the type of claim presented. Individuals
asserting public rights, even when Congress has sought to authorize them
to do so, must confront a robust version of these elements. By contrast,
states acting as parens patriae and asserting public rights need only
surmount a flaccid version of these elements.
question under the laws and treaties of the United States it would involve almost
every subject on which the executive could act. The division of power [among the
branches of the federal government] could exist no longer, and the other
departments would be swallowed up by the judiciary.
4 PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 95 (Charles Cullen ed., 1984). Marshall’s insight was echoed in Elk
Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004), where the Court declared that
“[t]he standing requirement is born partly of ‘an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than
a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an
unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government’” (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 750 (1984)). By contrast, Professor Cass Sunstein has argued that the present-day
elements of Article III are unsupported by text or history, but are a recent invention of federal
judges. See Cass Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 166 (1992). Sunstein reserves particular scorn for the injury-in-fact
requirement, which he characterizes “as a prominent contemporary version of early
twentieth-century substantive due process.” Id. at 167.
4. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The Court has stated that this
irreducible minimum requires
(1) that the plaintiff have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a judicially
cognizable interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that there be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury must be fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the
independent action of some third party not before the court; and (3) that it be
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997).
5. Federal courts can and do impose a variety of additional, prudential limitations upon
standing. For example, a plaintiff’s injury must come “within the zone of interests protected by the
law invoked.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); see also Air Courier Conference v. Am.
Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 523 (1991). Other examples include the doctrines that pertain
to third-party standing and associational, or organizational, standing. On third-party standing, see
generally Henry Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1984), which discusses
the trouble with reducing third-party standing to discretionary rules of judicial practice. On
associational standing, see Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333,
343 (1977), which recognized a three-part test of standing for an association to sue on behalf of its
members: the members would have standing on their own, the interests asserted are germane to the
association’s purpose, and neither the claim nor the requested relief requires the members’
participation. See also LAURENCE TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-20, at 450–52
(3d ed. 2000).
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What are the implications of this relaxation of the requirements for
state standing? To what extent does the easier version of standing apply
when states seek to vindicate public rights on behalf of their citizens?
What, if anything, justifies a two-tiered view of Article III’s case or
controversy requirement? This Article attempts to answer those questions.
Several possible alternative interpretations of EPA necessarily precede
any conclusion that it dilutes the case-or-controversy requirement for
assertions of public rights by states as parens patriae. First, EPA might
make no change at all to the constitutional core of standing. Perhaps it
merely reiterates the prior understanding of standing founded on
procedural injury. Second, EPA might change the elements of the
constitutional core of standing for all litigants. Third, EPA might create a
different constitutional understanding of a case or controversy when a state
is a party, regardless of whether it acts as parens patriae.
I contend that EPA does more than simply restate familiar principles of
standing to vindicate procedural injuries, but does not make global
alterations to the constitutional core of standing. The most persuasive
understanding of EPA is that it permits states, as parens patriae, to assert
generalized claims of injury suffered in common by all of its citizens that
would not be judicially cognizable if asserted by any individual citizen.
Moreover, with respect to such generalized injury, EPA softens both
causation and redressability. Causation is satisfied when the defendant’s
actions contribute to the injury, and redressability is present if the
requested relief will abate, to any degree, the identified injury. Finally,
states may act as the parent of their citizens with respect to vindication of
rights rooted entirely in federal law. Part II provides the flesh for these
assertions.
After teasing out this reading of EPA, this Article then undertakes to
answer the question: Should such a reading of EPA stand? Is there an
adequate justification for these changes, or is EPA aberrational, a sui
generis case highly colored by the alarm surrounding the prospect of
global warming? The Court made almost no attempt to justify its alteration
of the constitutional core of standing; indeed, its opinion is founded on the
implicit presumption that it makes no changes to our understanding of the
constitutional limits upon standing. Yet, reading EPA as conferring on
states the ability to assert the generalized injuries of its citizens, including
the amorphous injury inherent in lawless governmental conduct that
produces no particularized harm, reveals a justification based on
federalism. Diffusion of governmental power between the states and the
central government checks concentration of authority in one locus, with
attendant risk of authoritarian consequences. As Professor Rapaczynski
wrote, “because the states are governmental bodies that break the national
authorities’ monopoly on coercion . . . they constitute the most
fundamental bastion against a successful conversion of the federal
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government into a vehicle of the worst kind of oppression.”6 Although
ordinary citizens do not present a cognizable “case or controversy” when
they seek to vindicate a pure public right—the common entitlement of
citizens to demand that their government obey the law—the states occupy
a unique role in the liberty-enhancing structure of federalism. States may
properly be seen as fiduciaries of the public rights of the citizens,
especially with respect to those rights that citizens cannot vindicate in
federal court. The structure of federalism provides the best justification for
allowing states to assert in federal court generalized injuries suffered in
common by all its citizens that are attributable to claimed violations of
public rights. Part III develops this argument.
II. DESCRIPTION : WHAT HATH MAN WROUGHT ?7
There are three plausible readings of the effect of EPA on the
constitutional limits upon standing: (1) EPA involves only the special case
of procedural injury and merely restates prior doctrine on that point; (2)
EPA relaxes and broadens the concepts of injury in fact, causation, and
redressability with respect to all litigants, thus effecting a major alteration
in our understanding of the constitutional limits upon standing; and (3)
EPA applies only to instances in which states are litigants, but with respect
to that category, EPA alters the constitutional limits upon standing to
permit states to prosecute claims in federal court that would not be
cognizable if asserted by individuals. Each of these possibilities will be
considered below; all but the last possibility will be rejected.
A. “Ain’t Nobody Here But Us Chickens”8: Just Another Case of
Procedural Injury
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, placed considerable stress on
the existence of a procedural right that Massachusetts possessed. He noted
that “Congress has . . . authorized this type of challenge to EPA action,”9
citing a statute that restricts to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit any judicial review of EPA action in promulgating air quality
standards for new motor vehicles.10 Although the procedural right was not
6. Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism
After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 389 (1985).
7. The phrase “What hath God wrought!” (emphasis added) is from Numbers 23:23 (King
James), and was what Samuel F. B. Morse chose for the first telegraphic transmission on May 24,
1844. See Library of Congress, American Memory, Today in History: May 24,
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/today/may24.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2008).
8. LOUIS JORDAN, Ain’t Nobody Here But Us Chickens, on SWINGSATION (Mercury Records
1946).
9. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006) (“A petition for review of action of the [EPA]
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altogether clear from the face of the cited statute, I shall assume, as did the
majority, that Massachusetts possessed such a right.11 According to Lujan,
a “person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete
interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for
redressability and immediacy.”12 To Justice Stevens, that meant that a
plaintiff asserting a procedural right “has standing if there is some
possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to
reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.”13 Even though
redressability and immediacy may be diluted when procedural rights are
at issue, Lujan made clear that a plaintiff asserting a procedural right must
do so with respect to a particular and personal “concrete interest[]” that the
procedural right is intended to protect.14 Justice Stevens did not quarrel
with that requirement. Indeed, he labored to identify Massachusetts’
personal, particularized concrete interest injured by the EPA’s failure to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new cars. Massachusetts, he said,
had lost between ten and twenty centimeters of its coastline during the
twentieth century due to global warming, and that loss was a sufficient
“particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner.”15 But Justice Stevens
went further and characterized the predicted future inundation of
Massachusetts’ coastline during the twenty-first century as sufficient
threatened injury.16 Although Massachusetts sought to direct the EPA to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new cars, which represents only
a minute fraction of all greenhouse gases, the majority in EPA thought that
this remedy would redress Massachusetts’ threatened future injury: “The
risk of catastrophic harm [is] remote . . . [but] would be reduced to some
extent” by granting the requested relief.17

Administrator in promulgating any . . . standard under section 7521 of this title [pertaining to
emissions from new motor vehicles] or final action taken, by the Administrator under this chapter
may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.”).
11. Nowhere in § 7607(b)(1) is there any indication that the statute authorizes “any person,”
or “any aggrieved person,” or “any person who has urged the EPA Administrator to adopt a
contrary standard,” to institute suit in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Id. At best, it
authorizes any person who might otherwise have a right to sue to bring the action only in the D.C.
Circuit. Of course, the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006), provides that “[a]
person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” The citizen-suit provision of the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006), which provides that “any person may commence a civil action” to enforce
the provisions of the Clean Air Act, is of no help, for it merely eliminates any prudential barriers
to standing, such as the zone-of-interests requirement. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
164–65 (1997); George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
12. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
13. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518.
14. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
15. EPA, 549 U.S. at 522.
16. Id. at 522–23.
17. Id. at 526.
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If the Court stopped here, it might be reasonable to conclude that the
Court simply located Massachusetts’ claim within the existing structure of
standing based on procedural rights. The Court did more than this,
however, in two dimensions. First, it stretched the notion of concrete harm
that is protected by the grant of a procedural right and, as part of this
stretch, pushed the concepts of immediate harm and redressability to new
frontiers. Second, it placed exceptional weight on the fact that
Massachusetts is a state, a consideration foreign to prior notions of
standing premised upon a procedural right.
When a litigant asserts a procedural right, the reason to relax the
requirements of immediacy and redressability is to ensure full compliance
with the procedural requirements Congress imposed to protect against the
asserted concrete harm. This relaxation is to protect against the infliction
of real harm, not simply to ensure that such procedural requirements are
met for their own sake. Conferring standing in the absence of any
threatened concrete harm would enable individual plaintiffs to raise pure
public rights. A “generally available grievance about government”—the
abstract interest of “proper application of the Constitution and laws” that
is shared equally by “the public at large—does not state an Article III case
or controversy.”18 Instead, the Court identified two different injuries
suffered by Massachusetts, one actual and another threatened.19 But the
Court never acknowledged that the actual injury could not be remedied by
the relief sought, and the threatened injury was both too speculative to
qualify as injury (even to support a procedural interest) and was not
capable of redress (in the way that term has been previously understood).
The actual injury was the loss of an estimated four to eight inches of
the state’s coastline during the course of the twentieth century.20 The
threatened injury was the prospect of the loss of some uncertain additional
amount of coastline if global warming continued through the twenty-first
century.21 The actual injury is real and particularized, but is simply not
capable of being remedied by a judicial order to the EPA requiring
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new cars. The Court relied
on the scientific consensus concerning global warming to establish
Massachusetts’ actual injury, but the scientific consensus also holds that
the presently felt effects of global warning are not reversible.22 Thus, no
amount of regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from newly
manufactured cars will restore the state’s lost coastline.

18. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74.
19. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521.
20. See id. at 521 Joint Appendix at 225, EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL
2569818.
21. Id. at 521.
22. Id. at 522–23.
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The threatened injury is said to be almost certain to occur, but the
scientific community cannot agree on its timing and magnitude. Given the
scientific consensus that the future effects of global warming are
inevitable, even if carbon emissions were to be frozen at present levels or
reduced to some earlier level of industrialization and consumption, it is
difficult to understand how Massachusetts’ inevitable future injury can be
redressed by forcing the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
a tiny fraction of the global output of such gases. Indeed, it is hardly clear
that such regulation will reduce to any extent the risk of this apparently
inevitable inundation. Moreover, according to the dissent, the computer
models offered to support the predicted future injury contain such a large
margin of error that it is difficult to be certain that the claimed future
injury is inevitable.23 If this is so, Massachusetts may well have failed to
establish the concrete harm that is required for standing to assert a
procedural right. Of course, if the bare possibility of speculative and
remote future injury is sufficient to constitute concrete harm, it is far more
likely that a judicial order to the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases emitted
from new cars will reduce the risk of this speculative future injury.
Several possible conclusions follow from this analysis. If
Massachusetts’ standing was founded on a procedural interest alone, the
Court lowered the level of concrete harm necessary to support such
standing to include speculative and temporally remote injury, or reduced
redressability to a concept of some possibility that the relief might
imperceptibly reduce the risk of an inevitable but temporally remote future
injury, or both. Perhaps the Court regarded Massachusetts’ standing to
assert its procedural right as founded entirely upon its actual injury of past
inundation, but if this is so, the Court scrapped redressability as a required
element. This conclusion is unlikely, because the Court gave no indication
that it was eliminating redressability and, if it were doing so, it would have
been incumbent upon the majority to explain why this element of the
Article III case or controversy requirement is no longer necessary. Instead,
the Court accepted the necessity of establishing redressability, but did so
in the context of the threatened future injury facing Massachusetts.
In any event, if the Court viewed Massachusetts’ claim as a simple
assertion of a procedural right, it is inexplicable why the majority went to
such pains to emphasize Massachusetts’ status as a “sovereign State and
not . . . a private individual.”24 Perhaps the Court was intent on creating a
uniquely relaxed interpretation of Article III’s case-or-controversy
requirement when a state asserts a procedural right. If so, it is hard to
fathom why the Court grafted that notion onto the quite separate concept

23. Id. at 542 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 518 (majority opinion).
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of state standing as parens patriae. But that is what the Court seemed to
do: “Given that procedural right and Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its
quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to special
solicitude in our standing analysis.”25 The possibility that the Court
fashioned, inadvertently or deliberately, a new facet of standing—a flaccid
conception of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement when a state
asserts a procedural right as parens patriae—will be considered later.26
B. “The World Turned Upside Down”27: Global Warming Thaws
Article III
Despite the Court’s emphasis on the sovereign status of Massachusetts
and its assertion of a procedural right, perhaps EPA should be read as
reducing, for all litigants, the quantum of proof necessary to establish each
of the three elements of standing necessary to meet the case-or-controversy
requirement. There are a number of problems with this reading, not the
least of which is the Court’s implicit denial that it was doing any such
thing. For the sake of argument, however, assume the Court actually did
what it never said it did. How much of a difference would that reading of
EPA make in our understanding of the Article III limits on standing?
The major constraint with respect to assertion of an injury in fact is the
need to establish that the injury is personal or particularized. At first
glance, EPA works no change here. Massachusetts offered uncontroverted
scientific evidence that it had lost four to eight inches of its coastline.
However, as noted earlier, this injury is not capable of judicial redress,
given the scientific evidence that the present effects of global warming are
irreversible in any humanly meaningful time frame.28 Standing premised
on this injury necessitates a conclusion that the Court eliminated
redressability, but we cannot rest on this conclusion because the Court also
characterized Massachusetts’ injury as including an inevitable future loss
of its coastline, however remote and quantitatively uncertain that loss may
be. This conception of threatened injury reduces the requirement of
immediate injury to a vaporous incantation with no substance. Yet, if the
case is treated as an unremarkable instance of procedural injury, at most
the Court reduced immediacy to a gossamer film only with respect to
procedural rights. Thus, it is unlikely the Court altered the injury-in-fact
requirement with respect to all litigants.
25. Id. at 520.
26. See infra Part II.C.
27. THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN (English Ballad 1643).
28. See, e.g., James J. MacKenzie, Climate Protection and the National Interest: The Links
Among Climate Change, Air Pollution, and Energy Security, World Resources Institute, 1997,
available at http://www.wri.org/climate/pubs_content_text.cfm?cid=2149.
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The argument that the Court loosened the causation requirement is
more plausible. According to Lujan, the case-or-controversy requirement
demands that the plaintiff show that the injury of which he complains is
“fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct.29 Whatever the outer limits
of the nebulous concept of that which is “fairly traceable,” it is at least
clear (or was clear before EPA) that it does not include injuries produced
by the independent action of a stranger to the litigation.30 Massachusetts
asserted that global warming caused it to lose a minute portion of its
coastline, and that future inevitable increases in global temperatures would
cause it to lose more. Some of that global warming is attributable to carbon
dioxide emissions from new cars sold in the United States. The EPA’s
failure to regulate those emissions caused the total greenhouse gas
emissions to be higher than they would have been with such regulation.
Accordingly, Massachusetts’ injury was “fairly traceable” to the EPA’s
failure to regulate.
This chain of reasoning is not consistent with prior renditions of the
causation requirement. In Bennett v. Spear,31 the Court held that the “fairly
traceable” test was met when the Bureau of Reclamation injured
agricultural water users by reducing the water available to them to
conform to a biological opinion of the Fish and Wildlife Service.32 The
Court concluded the opinion of the Fish and Wildlife Service had a
powerful coercive effect on the legally independent decision of the Bureau
of Reclamation to restrict water supply to the plaintiffs.33 No such coercive
effect was established in EPA; rather, simply because the EPA’s failure to
regulate could be said to contribute to global warming, however
minimally, the injury suffered by Massachusetts was “fairly traceable” to
the EPA’s regulatory sloth. Nevermind that 94% of worldwide carbon
dioxide emissions come from sources beyond the EPA’s regulatory
authority.34 To be consistent with the “independent action” limit on
causation, one of two results must follow. Either those emissions are not
the product of independent actions of third parties, or only the unregulated

29. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
30. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757–59 (1984); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976) (“[A] federal court [may] act only to redress injury that fairly can
be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the independent
action of some third party not before the court.”); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504–05, 514
(1975).
31. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
32. Id. at 157, 167, 170–71.
33. “While . . . it does not suffice if the injury complained of is ‘“th[e] result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before the court,”’ that does not exclude injury produced
by determinative or coercive effect upon the action of someone else.” Id. at 169 (quoting Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560–61 (alterations in original) (emphasis added)).
34. EPA, 549 U.S. at 544.
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carbon dioxide fumes belched from American autos are the cause of
Massachusetts’ coastal woes.
Of course, these conjectures are fanciful; thus the conclusion must be
that the Court rendered the requirement that injury be “fairly traceable” to
the defendant’s challenged action into something quite different. After
EPA, it might be said that causation is established if a plaintiff can show
that the defendant’s actions contribute in some tiny way to the asserted
injury. Because procedural injury claims do not ordinarily relax the Article
III requirement of causation, at the very least, the Court in EPA diluted
causation for procedural injuries and, at most, deflated the entire concept
for all litigants, turning it into a limp rhetorical balloon.
For an injury to be sufficiently redressable to pose an Article III case
or controversy, it must “be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”35 In EPA, the
likelihood that court-ordered regulation of carbon dioxide emissions from
new cars would restore Massachusetts’ coastline to its nineteenth century
contours was nil.36 First, carbon dioxide composes only a fraction of all the
gases that produce the global greenhouse effect.37 Second, hydrocarbon
combustion accounts for only about 65% of the world’s carbon dioxide
emissions.38 Third, by the Court’s calculation, carbon dioxide emissions
from new cars in the United States account for between 6% and 7% of
worldwide carbon emissions,39 meaning these American auto emissions
represent about 4.5% of all carbon dioxide emissions. Fourth, about 80%
of global greenhouse gas emissions originate from outside the United
States,40 and it is a reasonable supposition that the pace of emissions from
such rapidly industrializing and populous nations such as China and India
will sharply increase as their economies grow, their citizens become
wealthier, and consumer appetites for autos and other carbon-fuel-using
creature comforts increase.41 In short, Massachusetts’ coastline is doomed,

35. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 167.
36. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
37. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Global Greenhouse Gas Data,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/globalghg.html.
38. See MICHAEL PIDWIRNY, FUNDAMENTALS OF PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY ch. 7 (2d ed.),
http://www.physicalgeography.net/fundamentals/7h.html; World Resources Institute, Sources,
Properties, and Emission Trends of the Important Greenhouse Gases,
http://www.wri.org/climate/pubs_content_text.cfm?cid=2162.
39. EPA, 549 U.S. at 525.
40. Id. at 545 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
41. See, e.g., China’s Auto Demand to Reach 20 Million in 2020, CHINA AUTOMOBILE NEWS,
Jan. 20, 2004; China’s Demand for Autos Expected to Reach 4.6 Million by 2005, ASIA PULSE
NEWS, Jan. 16, 2003; Clifford Krauss, China and U.S. Demand Drives Commodities Surge, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, at C1; Somini Sengupta, Indians Hit the Road Amid Elephants, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2008, at A1.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 2

FLO RID A LAW REVIEW

260

[V ol. 61

and there is nothing the Court or the EPA can do to save it. Not only is
Massachusetts’ injury unlikely to be redressed by the requested relief, it
is a virtual certainty that it is incapable of being redressed.
Of course, “the normal standards for redressability” need not be met to
prosecute a procedural right.42 Thus, the easiest and most plausible reading
of EPA’s dispensation of the redressability component to standing is that
it has been jettisoned only when a procedural right is at issue. But that
reading may be too dramatic. The Court evidently thought redressability
was satisfied (at least in the context of a procedural right) when the relief
requested would “slow the pace of global [carbon dioxide]
emissions . . . no matter what happens elsewhere.”43 In this new world of
redressability, if sea levels rise by six feet due to greenhouse gas emissions
from elsewhere, but a millionth of a millimeter of Massachusetts coastline
is preserved by court-ordered EPA regulation of carbon dioxide emissions
from American autos, the state’s injury has been redressed.
Given the sea of change wrought by the Court with respect to
redressability, one might have expected the Court to discuss the rationale
for its virtual elimination, if it was indeed the Court’s intent to dispense
with redressability as a core component of the Article III case-orcontroversy requirement. The fact that the Court did not do so, coupled
with its labored effort to demonstrate a smidgen of redress in the context
of a state’s assertion of a procedural right, argues strongly for the
conclusion that the Court was not seeking to accomplish a global
renovation of redressability. At most, one might conclude that EPA
elongated the permissible length of the causal chain that must be
demonstrated to support standing. Even that conclusion is tenuous, for it
must be qualified by the unavoidable fact that the Court placed great
emphasis on the dual facts that a state was a litigant, and the state was
asserting a procedural right.
C. Parens Patriae and Procedural Rights: When a State Comes
Marching In
A state may assert its own claims as a sovereign or as a proprietor, or,
via the doctrine of parens patriae, it may assert the non-sovereign or
“quasi-sovereign” interests of the public it represents.44 This Section
concludes that Massachusetts sued the EPA, in the latter capacity, by
asserting at least two possible quasi-sovereign interests.
42. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 n.7 (1992).
43. EPA, 549 U.S. at 526.
44. Parens Patriae: “A doctrine by which a government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit
on behalf of a citizen, esp. on behalf of someone who is under a legal disability to prosecute the
suit . . . . The state ordinarily has no standing to sue on behalf of its citizens, unless a separate,
sovereign interest will be served by the suit.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004).
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When a state asserts its proprietary interests it acts just like a private
citizen. Just as a private citizen who has suffered loss of his land due to
wrongful action of another must prove the Lujan elements to maintain an
action in federal court, so, too, must a state establish the Lujan elements.
Because Massachusetts’ injury was the loss of its coastal land, its claim
would appear to have been as a proprietor, but if so, the Court strangled by
construction the causation and redressability elements of Lujan, and did so
for all litigants. However, as discussed above, the Court did not appear to
effect a global alteration of the constitutional understanding of standing.
Moreover, because the Court attached significance to Massachusetts’
status as a state in analyzing its claim to standing—a fact that is utterly
irrelevant if Massachusetts were asserting only a proprietary interest—we
may assume that the Court treated Massachusetts as asserting either its
own uniquely sovereign interests or, as parens patriae, the public wellbeing of its citizenry.
When a state asserts a sovereign interest it seeks to vindicate an
attribute of its sovereignty, as when it brings a criminal prosecution, or
institutes a civil action to enforce its own laws. When the federal
government asserts such an interest in federal court, it has never been
formally required to prove injury in fact, causation, or redressability
because the presence of those elements is obvious. Inherent in violation of
law is injury to the polity for which the government is the agent. Whatever
other injury may be occasioned, defiance of the will of the people, as
manifested through their democratically selected representatives, is
injurious to the democratic process we have chosen to govern us. The
violator’s actions caused the injury, and the only remedy is judicially
imposed criminal punishment or civil sanctions. Thus, it is misleading to
suggest that compliance with the Lujan requirements is unnecessary when
the federal government asserts a sovereign interest in the federal courts.45
1. The Role of the Federal Forum
Whatever interest Massachusetts was asserting, it did so in federal
court, a court of another sovereign—a fact that raises the question of
whether different standing rules ought to apply to sovereign claims made
by the federal government in its own courts and sovereign interests
asserted by a state in the federal courts. Because the Lujan elements
describe the “irreducible minimum” for an Article III case or controversy,
they should apply to sovereign interests, whether asserted by a state or the
federal government. Nothing in the text of Article III suggests that “case

45. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 293, 300–01 (2005); cf. Ann Woolhandler & Michael Collins, State Standing, 81 VA.
L. REV. 387, 506, 510 (1995).
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or controversy” has two levels of meaning, with a lower threshold for
cases or controversies presenting sovereign interests. On the contrary, the
case or controversy requirement limits all federal judicial power. Only
then does Article III proceed to specify the categories of federal
jurisdiction, among which are included cases or controversies in which the
states or the United States may be a party.
The best argument for relaxing the meaning of the Lujan elements
when a state asserts a sovereign interest in federal court is that doing so is
a necessarily implied aspect of the structural design of dual sovereignty.
When federal law arguably invades state sovereignty in a constitutionally
invalid manner, the balance of federalism is distorted if a state is unable
to assert its sovereign interests in federal court. Whether federalism should
primarily be politically or judicially enforceable is debatable, but closing
the federal courts to state claims founded on sovereign interests denies the
federal judiciary the opportunity to decide when federalism issues are
properly decided by the judiciary. Of course, the Lujan elements will
likely be satisfied in most instances of federal invasion of state sovereign
interests. Such actions will likely inflict injury adequate to meet Lujan’s
requirements, that the injury will be directly traceable to the challenged
action of the federal government, and invalidation of the challenged action
would provide complete redress.
However, Massachusetts was not asserting a sovereign interest.46 Both
its actual and threatened injuries were injuries to a single proprietary
interest—the loss of its coastal land.47 Yet the Court did not treat
Massachusetts as it would a private litigant because it permitted
Massachusetts to press its claim without adequate proof of either causation
or redressability, as those elements have been previously understood. The
Court said that Massachusetts was asserting a quasi-sovereign interest48
but then identified the injury in fact that supported its claim to standing as
a run-of-the-mill proprietary interest.49 This is not to say that
Massachusetts lacked a quasi-sovereign interest,50 but only to note that the
Court did not rely on such an interest in analyzing the state’s claim of
standing.
Much of the confusion generated by the Court in EPA lies in its use of
Massachusetts’ injury. In Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex

46. But see infra note 48.
47. See supra note 15.
48. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520 (“Given . . . Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign
interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.”).
49. Id. at 521–22.
50. Massachusetts certainly has a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its citizens from the
effects of global warming, an interest in protecting “the health and well-being . . . of its residents.”
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
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rel. Barez,51 the Court described the nature of a quasi-sovereign interest
that supports state standing as parens patriae.52 A “[s]tate must articulate
an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties . . . . [M]ore
must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group of individual
residents . . . .”53 Parens patriae standing permits a state to seek judicial
review of public rights, but such standing must be founded upon an
interest, or injury, that is not of the same character as that suffered
individually by its citizens. If a state suffers an injury that is of the same
type as that suffered by its citizens, it can seek vindication of its own
injury, just as private citizens may, but it may not use its own injury to
represent its citizens as parens patriae. By relying on a string of parens
patriae cases, particularly Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,54 the Court
in EPA appeared to conclude that Massachusetts was suing as parens
patriae, but the injury upon which Massachusetts relied was the state’s
loss of coastal land, an injury precisely the same as that suffered by private
coastal landowners.55
2. Massachusetts’ Two Quasi-Sovereign Interests
Either the Court expanded the universe of injury upon which parens
patriae standing can be founded, or it identified but did not articulate a
different quasi-sovereign interest of Massachusetts. There are at least two
possible quasi-sovereign interests that Massachusetts possessed, and either
of them would have been sufficient to support parens patriae standing.
First, Massachusetts had a separate interest in protecting the “health and
well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents in general”56
from the effects of global warming. Second, Massachusetts had “an
interest in securing observance of the terms under which it participates in
the federal system, [which] means ensuring that the State and its residents
are not excluded from the benefits that are to flow from participation in the
federal system.”57 Massachusetts claimed that the EPA was shirking its
obligation under the Clean Air Act to regulate carbon dioxide emissions
from new cars.58 Because Congress had exercised its power to displace
state law in this area, and had undertaken to deliver the benefits of
unpolluted air to all Americans by addressing a problem that in its nature
transcends state boundaries, the alleged failure of the EPA to act excluded

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

458 U.S. 592 (1982).
Id. at 607.
Id.
206 U.S. 230 (1907).
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521–23 (2007).
Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607.
Id. at 607–08.
EPA, 549 U.S. at 505.
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Massachusetts residents from one of the benefits of our federal system.
Thus, one reading of EPA is simply that the requisite quasi-sovereign
interest was present twice, but the Court did not dwell on the existence of
either interest. The other reading is that the Court in EPA broadened
parens patriae standing by permitting states to assert a proprietary interest
as a basis for standing rather than a quasi-sovereign interest.
The quasi-sovereign reading is strengthened by the fact that the Court
did address the related, but conceptually distinct, question of whether a
state may assert, as parens patriae, the general interest of its residents “in
respect of their relations with the federal government.”59 Although in
Massachusetts v. Mellon,60 the Court stated that when it comes to
“relations with the federal government . . . it is the United States, and not
the state, which represents them,”61 the Court in EPA construed Mellon to
mean only that a state had no parens patriae standing “to protect citizens
of the United States from the operation of [federal] statutes,”62 but it did
have such standing to demand that its residents be provided the benefits of
federal law.63 To be sure, in distinguishing Mellon, the Court stated that
Massachusetts was asserting “its rights under federal law,”64 a locution that
59. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923).
60. Id. In Mellon, both an individual taxpayer and Massachusetts challenged the
constitutional validity of federal monetary grants to the states to promote maternal health. Id. at
479. The Court ruled that Massachusetts’ claim was not justiciable because it presented abstract
questions of political power, sovereignty, and governance. Id. at 483. The taxpayer’s claim was
rejected because her injury—taxation to support the allegedly unconstitutional spending—was
remote and uncertain, and if it occurred at all, the effect on the taxpayer was “minute and
indeterminable” and “shared with millions of others.” Id. at 487. Although the Court did not use
the term “standing,” it attributed its result to the case or controversy requirement, id. at 480, and
the case is widely regarded as an articulation of standing doctrine. It is relevant to the argument
developed in Part III of this Article that the Court’s rationale partook of separation of powers
concerns:
We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that
they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered only when the
justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable
issue, is made to rest upon such an act . . . . [Judicial review] amounts to little
more than the negative power to disregard an unconstitutional enactment, which
otherwise would stand in the way of the enforcement of a legal right.
Id. at 488. While the case or controversy requirement limits judicial review, one must wonder about
a construction of that requirement that denies to anyone the ability to challenge the validity of
governmental action. That important issue will be taken up in Part III.
61. Id. at 486.
62. Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
63. EPA, 595 U.S. at 520 n.17.
64. Id. (emphasis added). According to the Court,
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suggests that Massachusetts’ interest was either a proprietary interest or a
sovereign interest. The former interpretation of this cryptic comment is
consistent with the Court’s reliance upon Massachusetts’ proprietary
interest as a coastal landowner as its injury in fact. The latter
interpretation, while unsupported by the Clean Air Act (because none of
its relevant provisions confer any unique or special sovereign benefit upon
states), might be taken as a repudiation of Mellon’s dismissal of a state’s
sovereign interest as a basis for challenging the legitimacy of federal
action.65
In Mellon, the Court rejected Massachusetts’ sovereign interest as only
an “abstract question[] of political power, of sovereignty, of
government.”66 In EPA, by contrast, Massachusetts had a sovereign
interest in its territorial integrity.67 Ironically, that sovereign interest was
also a proprietary interest. The Court was remiss in not noting this
complete overlap, which the Court could have used to clarify the extent to
which a state may assert its sovereign interests against the federal
government in federal court. Georgia v. Stanton68 was the most notable
prior case of a state’s claim that its sovereign interests had been wrongly
invaded by the federal government, but Stanton arose in the charged
circumstances of Reconstruction and presented an attempt by a state to
shield itself from federal law.69 In EPA, Massachusetts sought to protect
its sovereign interest in territorial inviolability by demanding the benefits
of federal law.70

there is a critical difference between allowing a State ‘to protect her citizens from
the operation of federal statutes’ (which is what Mellon prohibits) and allowing
a State to assert its rights under federal law (which it has standing to do).
Massachusetts does not . . . dispute that the Clean Air Act applies to its citizens;
it rather seeks to assert its rights under the Act.
Id.
65. The late Professor David Currie, for one, contended that Mellon’s conclusion that
a state could not sue to protect merely sovereign interests was not at all obvious.
Not only would such a proceeding assure judicial review of actions that might
otherwise go unreviewed, but the state seems a logical defender of the position
that state rights have been invaded by federal legislation—and that was the claim
in Mellon.
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY 1888–1986
185 (1990).
66. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485.
67. EPA, 595 U.S. at 519.
68. 73 U.S. (1 Wall.) 50 (1867).
69. See id. at 60–62.
70. EPA, 595 U.S. at 520 n.17.
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However, if the Court’s reference in EPA to Massachusetts’ rights
under federal law was not meant to permit a state to assert its sovereign
interests, the remaining possibilities are that the reference was to the
state’s proprietary interests or to its quasi-sovereign interests, as parens
patriae. The proprietary interest reading of this passage is less persuasive
than the quasi-sovereign interest reading for three reasons. First, in the
same passage the Court explicitly identified Massachusetts’ interest as a
quasi-sovereign interest.71 Second, the Court repeatedly relied upon the
presence of a quasi-sovereign interest in the prior parens patriae cases that
it cited, and identified quasi-sovereign interest as some form of preserving
the well-being of a state’s residents.72 Third, by describing the Mellon
limitation upon parens patriae standing as only prohibiting states from
contesting the applicability of federal law to its residents, the Court
implied that a state has standing to enforce the benefits of federal law for
its residents.73 In this context, the Court’s declaration that a state has
standing to assert “its rights under federal laws” is careless usage. If
Mellon only denies to states standing to shield its residents from federal
law, its mirror image must be to permit states to wield a sword to ensure
that its residents are included within the protections of federal law. When
so understood, the Court in EPA was actually saying that a state has
standing to assert the rights of its residents under federal law.
This reading fails to remove all difficulties. Because the entire concept
of parens patriae standing is rooted in the notion of a government
representing its people, the Mellon limitation could mean that only the
federal government has standing as parens patriae to obtain either judicial
enforcement or limitation of federal law. While such a reading of Mellon
is consistent with two structural principles of our federal system, it ignores
an even more important reality. Federal union created a national
government that may act directly upon (and for) the people and, because
Congress is composed of members elected by state polities, it may be
reasonable to assume that state interests are adequately “protected by
procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system.”74
Those principles might be sufficient to explain why a state ought not have
standing to contest the application of federal law to its residents, but they
are not sufficient to explain why a state lacks standing to demand that its
residents be given the benefits that accrue from enforcement of federal
law.

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 520.
Id. at 520 n.17.
Id.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985).
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3. State Limits on the Federal Administrative State
The vast federal bureaucracy that composes the contemporary
administrative state lacks the “procedural safeguards” that apply to
Congress. Agencies operate under broad delegations of authority, and are
never directly answerable to state polities. Moreover, for the most part,
administrative agencies are ultimately controlled by the President, which
leads to the dispute at issue in EPA—differing interpretations of a
congressional command to an executive agency. Because agencies have
vast discretion to carry out Congress’ commands,75 the question of who
has standing to challenge the exercise of that discretion should be
informed by the disconnection between Congress and administrative
agencies. The method of electing Congress provides a “procedural
safeguard” for state polities that is wholly absent with respect to
administrative agencies. Especially when Congress has conjoined a
command to an agency with a procedural right, it is reasonable to infer that
Congress has endowed the people’s representatives with the power to
vindicate that right, so long as the requisite elements of an Article III case
or controversy are present.
By the design of the federal system, the people have two
representatives. The federal representative may be the proper agent to act
as parens patriae with respect to federal law, and the state representatives
may be the proper agents to act as such with respect to state law. However
this condition breaks down when Congress delegates to an agency the
power to grant or withhold the benefits of federal law because of the
rupture of accountability to the people that this delegation entails. Thus,
when Congress creates procedural rights in agency commands, it should
be seen to have vested in two sovereigns a concurrent power to act as
parens patriae.
Of course, the Court did not say this in EPA, even though it explicitly
concluded that a state has standing as parens patriae to enforce the
benefits of federal law to secure the well-being of its people.76 The
explanation offered here supplies a missing rationale. Mellon’s insistence
upon an exclusive role for the federal government as parens patriae with
respect to federal law ignores a prominent feature of federalism:
concurrent power. Of course many powers are exclusively federal, but
when Congress uses its commerce power, which it shares concurrently
with the states, to regulate air pollutants and simultaneously creates in the
states a procedural right in enforcement of the regulation, it is myopic to
think that the only body able to act as parens patriae is the federal

75. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 844
(1984).
76. EPA, 595 U.S. at 520 n.17.
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government. Federal regulation bottomed on a concurrent power, coupled
with an expansive procedural right to its enforcement, implies that either
the federal or a state governmental agent of the people has power to seek
judicial enforcement of the measure.77
The most plausible explanation of EPA is that it is a parens patriae
case, but one in which the doctrine of parens patriae is extended in either,
or both, of two directions. First, the Court may have permitted parens
patriae standing to be founded upon proprietary or sovereign injury. Not
only is this explanation an abrupt and unexplained departure from the prior
understanding of parens patriae, it is both unnecessary to the result and
inconsistent with some of the Court’s rationale. Second, the Court
definitely repudiated Mellon’s broad assertion that only the federal
government could act as parens patriae with respect to rights or
obligations arising under federal law. By recognizing that states may act
for their residents by asserting the quasi-sovereign interest of preserving
the well-being of their residents with respect to benefits to which they may
be entitled under federal law, the Court in EPA opened a portal for
adventurous state litigation as parens patriae. What is the scope of this
broadened power of states to litigate in federal court? Part III addresses
that question.
III. PRESCRIPTION : WHY FEDERALISM JUSTIFIES EXPANSIVE PARENS
PATRIAE STANDING
Because the Court in EPA combined its expansion of parens patriae
standing with a state’s assertion of a congressionally created procedural
right, the question of the proper scope of parens patriae standing must be
examined twice. The first question occurs when a state acts as parens
patriae to assert a procedural right. The second, and more speculative
question, is presented when a state acts as parens patriae to assert a
quasi-sovereign interest unsupported by any claim of procedural injury.
A. Parens Patriae and Procedural Rights
Creation of a procedural right is, by itself, an insufficient launch pad
for parens patriae standing. While Congress may be able to “define
injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or
controversy where none existed before,”78 to create parens patriae
standing it must do so by defining injury to a quasi-sovereign interest. If
a quasi-sovereign interest inheres in preserving a state’s residents from

77. The issue of state standing to enforce federal requirements has arisen in numerous
contexts. See, e.g., Samantha K. Graff, State Taxation of Online Tobacco Sales, 58 FLA. L. REV.
375, 383–84 (2006).
78. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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generalized and undifferentiated injury—which is the injury threatened by
global warming—Congress may be able to endow states with the ability
to assert such generalized injuries as parens patriae, even though
individuals are barred from doing so. Yet that power, assuming it has been
created by EPA, is not unlimited. A quasi-sovereign interest must still
involve a “concrete” injury. To evaluate these claims, consider the
following hypotheticals.
1. How “Concrete” Must the Injury Be?
Suppose that Congress amended the War Powers Resolution79 to grant
to any state, acting in its capacity as parens patriae, the power to bring suit
in the federal district court for the District of Columbia to enforce the
provisions of the statute. Then, following the amendment, the President
orders armed forces into northwestern Pakistan to locate and apprehend
Osama bin Laden. California seeks to enforce Section 5 of the Resolution,
which requires termination of this military exercise after sixty days, unless
Congress has specifically authorized this use of force. The federal
government argues that California lacks standing. On the merits, the
federal government contends that the War Powers Resolution is an
unconstitutional usurpation of executive power. In the alternative, it
contends that the challenged military action is authorized by the September
18, 2001 joint resolution that empowered the President “to use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations . . . or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks
that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such . . . persons.”80
Does EPA adequately support California’s claimed standing as parens
patriae?81
California’s injury in fact may take several possible forms. First,
California may argue that it seeks to prevent the loss of life or health to its
citizens serving in the armed forces in Pakistan. Second, California may
contend that one aspect of the well-being of its citizens is ensuring that the
federal government acts in conformity with law. The objection to the first
injury is that the state is but a nominal party, lacking any interest of its
own, whether sovereign, proprietary, or quasi-sovereign,82 but this
objection may be misplaced. The Court has recognized that a state’s

79. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2006).
80. Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
81. Of course, this issue may be a non-justiciable political question, but that is a separate
issue with which this Article is not concerned.
82. Parens patriae “does not involve the States stepping in to represent the interests of
particular citizens . . . . [I]f nothing more than this is involved—i e., if the State is only a nominal
party without a real interest of its own—then it will not have standing under the parens patriae
doctrine.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex. rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 2

270

FLO RID A LAW REVIEW

[V ol. 61

interest in securing either the “general well-being of its residents” or
“observance of the terms under which it participates in the federal system”
qualifies as a quasi-sovereign interest.83 The Court characterized the
former interest as including the physical and economic interests of its
residents,84 but did not limit it to those categories. A useful indicator of the
presence of a state’s quasi-sovereign interest in the “health and welfare of
its citizens . . . is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would
likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.”85
Surely if California were an independent sovereign it would exercise its
sovereign lawmaking power to address whether its citizens should be
engaged in military operations in Pakistan. While Californians serving in
the armed services are susceptible to this injury, the State’s interest goes
well beyond the individual interest; the impact of combat wounds to
Californians resonates in the economic and emotional climate of the state.
If Massachusetts has parens patriae standing to protect the geophysical
climate that affects its citizens, California might have parens patriae
standing to protect the physical and emotional welfare of its people. In
both cases the state is acting to make the federal government include its
citizens within the benefits of federal law, not to wall its citizens off from
the obligations of federal law. In EPA, the Court said that distinction is
critical to state eligibility to act as parens patriae with respect to rights
originating in federal law.
The question is whether the second injury is sufficiently concrete to
constitute quasi-sovereign injury.86 In EPA, the Court dodged this
question. Even though the Court treated Massachusetts as possessing
parens patriae standing, the injury it overtly credited to support that
standing was the proprietary or sovereign injury of loss of its coastal lands.
Yet, because the Court never even intimated that it was dispensing with
the requirement of a quasi-sovereign interest, it is far more likely that the
covert injury that supported Massachusetts’ standing was the looming
threat to the health and welfare of its citizens posed by global warming.
Thus, EPA implicitly recognizes that speculative, though possibly
inevitable, injury to the welfare of a state’s citizens is sufficient injury to
support the quasi-sovereign interest that is the foundation of parens
patriae standing. California’s interest in ensuring that the federal
government’s foreign military expeditions conform to federal law is no
less concrete. Californians will inevitably be subject to this expedition and
will incur some portion of the grief and loss that accompany any military

83. Id. at 607–08.
84. Id. at 607.
85. Id.
86. “A quasi-sovereign interest must be sufficiently concrete to create an actual controversy
between the State and the defendant.” Id. at 602.
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adventure. Not only is such injury as equally inevitable as global warming,
it is far more immediate.
Moreover, a state has a quasi-sovereign interest in securing
“observance of the terms under which it participates in the federal
system.”87 By constitutional union, the states ceded to the federal
government their authority to conduct war,88 but simultaneously placed
limitations on the process by which the federal government can commit
the nation to war.89 Thus, one of the terms under which states participate
in the federal system is an implicit promise that the federal government
will adhere to the constitutional limits upon its war-making power.
Vindication of this promise is not a sovereign interest of a state, because
constitutional union extinguished the states’ sovereign power to wage war,
but it is a quasi-sovereign interest.
An objection to this conclusion is that the injury suffered by the state
is really the undifferentiated interest of all citizens in ensuring that the
government conform to law, and this interest has been repeatedly held to
be insufficient to support injury in fact. While parens patriae standing
doctrine holds that a state must have an injury as concrete as that needed
to support individual standing, and EPA does not purport to overturn that
requirement, the effect of EPA is to call that proposition into question. The
only concrete injury proffered by Massachusetts was loss of coastal lands,
an injury suffered in both its proprietary and sovereign capacities. The
quasi-sovereign injury asserted by Massachusetts was the speculative
deleterious effects attributable to the increase in global warming produced
by the EPA’s failure to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from new cars
sold in America. That quasi-sovereign injury is as undifferentiated as the
alleged failure of the federal government to observe the Incompatibility
Clause90 (held to be inadequate injury in Schlesinger91) or the Statement
and Account Clause92 (held to be inadequate injury in Richardson93), yet
was sufficient to support standing in EPA. The explanation must be that
EPA tacitly altered the injury-in-fact requirement for parens patriae
standing, at least when Congress has acted to create a procedural right.
Post-EPA, states may now assert the undifferentiated interest of all citizens
in governmental conformity to law when Congress has empowered states
to do so, and generalized injury is sufficient to constitute quasi-sovereign
injury.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 607–08.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
Id. at art. I, § 6.
See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
See infra note 107 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 2

272

FLO RID A LAW REVIEW

[V ol. 61

Suppose that Congress were to react to Hein v. Freedom From Religion
Foundation, Inc.94 by vesting in states the authority to bring suit in federal
court to determine whether discretionary executive expenditures in aid of
religion violate the Establishment Clause. Hein established that individual
taxpayers lack standing to bring such challenges.95 Does a state have a
quasi-sovereign interest in making the same claim? While part of the
“well-being” of a state’s residents may be the knowledge that the federal
government is not using public funds to aid religion in a constitutionally
prohibited fashion, that interest is generalized and undifferentiated. Is there
any material difference between this interest and that of the plaintiffs in
Schlesinger or Richardson?96 Is this interest any more general than
Massachusetts’ quasi-sovereign interest in slowing the effects of global
warming on its residents?
Perhaps this quasi-sovereign interest is inadequate because it is
insufficiently concrete, but Massachusetts’ interest was no more solid. The
best that can be said for Massachusetts’ interest was that the threatened
injury, though lacking in details, had a strong odor of inevitability. That
might also be true in this hypothetical: over time certainly some executive
spending in aid of religion will occur.
Yet, not every general and undifferentiated injury may suffice to
support parens patriae standing, even when Congress has acted to create
a procedural right, because some injuries may fail even the diluted postEPA concrete injury requirement. Suppose that Congress were to endow
states with power to bring suit to contest the validity of the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment,97 and Ohio does so, contending that the
amendment is invalid by reason of its non-contemporaneous ratification.
Although the quasi-sovereign interest implicated here is no less (or more)
generalized than in EPA or the prior examples, what concrete injury to the
health and welfare of Ohio residents exists? Is there concrete injury to the
terms upon which Ohio participates in the Union? The connection between
the well-being of Ohioans and the procedure by which congressional pay
raises are implemented is tenuous at best. While the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment ensures that Ohioans can oust their federal representatives
before representatives can profit from a self-enacted pay raise, Ohioans
could also do so after the pay raise. Without the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment Ohioans would suffer the extremely slight financial loss
resulting from earlier implementation of congressional pay raises, but that
injury is redressed by the amendment. Perhaps the amendment inflicts on

94. 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (holding that taxpayers lack standing to challenge discretionary
executive expenditures as Establishment Clause violations).
95. Id. at 2559.
96. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII.
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Ohioans a less-qualified Congress, due to heightened congressional
reluctance to raise members’ pay, and consequent diminution of an
incentive to serve in Congress. Such injury is fanciful. Concrete injury is
necessary.
Nor would Ohio possess a quasi-sovereign interest in securing the
terms of its participation in federal union adequate to support parens
patriae standing. Ohio’s interest in limiting constitutional amendments to
those that have some unspecified range of contemporaneous ratification is
hardly obvious. The amendment procedure set forth in Article V of the
Constitution may be a term of state participation in the union but any
requirement of contemporaneous ratification is a later gloss on that text.
The only injury Ohio has suffered by non-contemporaneous ratification is
annoyance that a series of state legislatures, far removed in time from one
another, could combine to alter the national charter. This situation is far
removed from the injury presented should ratification of a constitutional
amendment be premised on, say, inclusion of the Guam and Puerto Rico
legislatures for purposes of reaching the requisite super-majority.
Moreover, Ohio has no interest in the underlying substance of the
amendment—the timing and amount of the paycheck its federal
representatives receive from the federal government. The quasi-sovereign
interest sought to be asserted here is simply absent.
2. Separation of Powers and Public Interests
The principle of separation of powers is most often advanced as a
reason for denying standing to individuals who assert only generalized
grievances. In Lujan, the Court reasoned that generalized grievances about
governmental infidelity to law presented no concrete individual injury, but
only a public interest, and “[v]indicating the public interest (including the
public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is
the function of Congress and the Chief Executive.”98 Because the
“concrete injury requirement” is grounded in separation of powers, to
permit “Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in
executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’
vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer, from the
President to the courts, the Chief Executive’s most important
constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”99
Whether or not this transfer exists when Congress attempts to permit
individuals to vindicate such public rights, the objection is much less
forceful when Congress seeks to permit states, as parens patriae, to
vindicate quasi-sovereign public rights. Quasi-sovereign rights are public

98. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992).
99. Id. at 577 (quoting U.S. CONST. art II, § 3).
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rights, so the argument that Congress cannot endow individuals with
power to vindicate undifferentiated public rights is irrelevant to the
question of whether Congress may vest such authority in states acting as
parens patriae. If it is constitutionally objectionable to allow states to
assert public rights, it must be due to some other aspect of separation of
powers.
In Lujan, the Court declared, with no further explanation, that allowing
individuals to vindicate in court the undifferentiated public interest of
governmental compliance with law would transfer the executive’s duty to
faithfully execute the law to the courts.100 Presumably this is so because
the absence of concrete individual injury transforms what might be a case
or controversy into an abstract consideration of whether the executive’s
exercise of discretion is appropriate. Yet, if the executive is flouting law,
why should courts not adjudicate that? The usual reason is that, without an
individual stake in the controversy, a court would “serve as a convenient
forum for policy debates.”101 The vice in this, is that a court steps out of its
judicial role—to resolve “legal questions . . . in a concrete factual context
conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial
action”102—and thus unnecessarily constrains the discretion of the political
branches to make or enforce law.
The question that arises when Congress acts to give the states the
power to vindicate public rights in federal court is whether the same
separation-of-powers dangers are present as when Congress purports to
endow individuals with that power. When states assert public rights there
is no alchemical conversion of undifferentiated public interests into private
injuries. Rather, Congress’s power to vest the states with authority to
vindicate federal public rights is limited by the requirement that Congress
may only do so with respect to quasi-sovereign interests. Congress is not
free to empower the states to act as parens patriae to vindicate an interest
that is outside the realm of quasi-sovereign interests. Moreover, the
concern that individuals litigating undifferentiated public rights will clog
federal courts with abstract arguments over policy choices, is not realistic
when such assertions of public rights are limited to states as parens
patriae. State attorneys general have limited resources and are politically
constrained.103 States will only assert the most pressing of public interests
100. Id.
101. Massachusetts v. EPA, 595 U.S. 497, 547 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
102. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
103. Forty-three states elect their Attorneys General by popular vote. The Maine Attorney
General is chosen by secret ballot of the legislature. Me. Const., Art. IX, § 11 (2008). Tennessee
vests in its Supreme Court the power to appoint the Attorney General. Tenn. Const., Art. VI, § 5
(2008). In five states (Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Wyoming) the Attorney
General is appointed by the Governor. Attorneys General in the territories of American Samoa,
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and then only to the extent that Congress has empowered them to do so.
This will hardly result in a flood of abstract policy disputes masquerading
as federal lawsuits. What will result is litigation of relatively few issues of
compliance with federal law—those issues that have a significant impact
upon the welfare of a state’s residents or that threaten to deny a state its
rightful Constitutional place.
A key point of our federal system is the belief that federalism will
better preserve liberty by diffusing governmental power. This principle is
no less key to our understanding of separation of powers. Recognition of
a congressional power to authorize states to litigate quasi-sovereign public
rights is an additional diffusion of power. It introduces a further level of
accountability of the executive to courts at the behest of any of the states
of the union. This diffusion of power permits multiple opportunities for
checking abuses of authority.
A pragmatic and cynical critic might ask why Congress would permit
states to challenge that which it could resolve on its own. There are several
possible answers. First, most such instances would likely occur when
Congress has charged an executive agency to carry out a legislatively
prescribed scheme, and Congress might desire to use the states, as parens
patriae, to enforce the congressional design. Congress embraced the
notion of citizen suits to enforce federal regulatory measures in the years
before Lujan curbed such grants of standing, so it is reasonable to think
that Congress would be equally willing to adopt this method of enforcing
public rights in federal court. Second, there may be some instances in
which Congress might wish to allow the courts to resolve a disputed issue
of the scope of executive discretion to carry out a legislative directive,
rather than directly narrowing the scope of executive discretion. Indeed,
global warming might be such an issue.104
While this approach, when done consciously, may be an abdication of
political responsibility, as a constitutional matter it is no more of an
abdication than what is presently permitted under the moribund nondelegation doctrine. Moreover, there is no persuasive force in the argument

Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands are also appointed. In the
District of Columbia, the Mayor appoints the Corporation Counsel, who functions similarly to a
state Attorney General. See generally National Association of Attorneys General,
http://www.naag.org/how_does_one_become_an_attorney-general.php. With respect to popularly
elected Attorneys General, accountability may be diluted by term limits on service as Attorney
General, or accountability may be enhanced by those term limits, assuming that an Attorney
General forced to leave office may aspire to some other public office for which he or she might be
eligible.
104. Of course, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006), on which the majority in EPA relied for
Massachusetts’ procedural right, was enacted before global warming entered our consciousness,
but even after that moment Congress could have given explicit direction to the EPA concerning
regulation of carbon dioxide emitted by new cars.
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that broad delegations of legislative authority to agencies are valid grants
of executive discretion concerning enforcement of the legislative charge,
but vesting states with power to vindicate public rights in federal court are
unconstitutional transfers of executive discretion to the judiciary. Such an
argument ignores the fact that states, unlike individuals, are appropriate
custodians of public rights, and state assertion of public rights in federal
court does no more than ensure that executive discretion is confined within
the boundaries of the Constitution and federal law. Inasmuch as both
separation of powers and federalism are structural doctrines designed to
check concentration of power, it is reasonable to join federalism with
separation-of-powers principles when the result is to create an additional
check on power wielded by a single branch of government.
There may well be some public rights that Congress would refuse to
consign to the courts via the parens patriae role of the states. For example,
there is no reason to think that a Congress composed of reserve officers in
the armed services would act to give the states authority to bring the
challenge actually raised in Schlesinger.105 Nor is there any reason that a
Congress disinclined to make a public accounting of the expenditures of
the Central Intelligence Agency would permit the states to make the claim
raised in Richardson.106 Indeed, the likelihood that Congress would not
freely authorize the states to act as parens patriae to vindicate public
rights should be of some comfort to those who fear that EPA approved
parens patriae standing as a vehicle for unlimited litigation of public
rights in federal court.
Lujan may have sought to bury the citizen suit to vindicate public
rights, but EPA revives it in a new and more limited form. Although
Congress may not enable ordinary citizens to prosecute public rights in the
absence of a personal injury caused by the defendant and dressable by the
courts, Congress may empower states, as parens patriae, to vindicate
public rights even when injury, causation, or redressability is insufficient
to support citizen standing. EPA thus creates two tiers of Article III cases
or controversies. Two questions emerge from that fact. Is parens patriae
standing to litigate public rights dependent upon congressional action?
What justifies two tiers of Article III cases or controversies?

105. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 214 (1974) (finding
no standing, as either citizens or taxpayers, for a group of former members of the Armed Forces
Reserve who challenged the Reserve membership of Congressional members as violating the
Incompatibility Clause of the Constitution).
106. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 167–68 (1974) (finding that the
respondent had no standing as a federal taxpayer in questioning provisions, under Article I, § 9,
clause 7 of the Constitution, concerning public reporting of agency expenditures by the Central
Intelligence Agency).
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B. Parens Patriae Without Procedural Injury
State standing as parens patriae to assert undifferentiated public rights
should not depend on congressional authorization of such claims. EPA did
not decide that question, of course, because Congress had created a
procedural right, but it implicitly approved parens patriae standing in the
absence of a procedural right. The objections to state standing as parens
patriae to assert undifferentiated public rights are identical whether or not
a procedural right is present. Because EPA found those objections
unpersuasive when Congress had acted, they should have no more force
when Congress has not acted.
The principal objection is that to permit states, as parens patriae, to
assert claims rooted in injuries suffered by all members of the polity is to
repudiate the principle that injury suffered “in some indefinite way in
common with people generally” is insufficient to support standing.107 That
principle is founded on the claim that only a “concrete factual context [is]
conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial
action,”108 which, in turn, is grounded in the constitutional principle of
separation of powers.109 On this view, Congress cannot engage in
constitutional alchemy by turning undifferentiated public rights into
individual rights that individual plaintiffs may redeem at the courthouse
door.110
However, recognizing state power to vindicate in federal court
undifferentiated public rights is consistent with both federalism and
separation of powers, and is not a recognition of a general power to
transmute public rights into individual rights. The engine of federalism is
not simply state autonomy; federalism’s value also lies in its potential to

107. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923); see also Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217
(“[T]he generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance . . . is an abstract injury”
insufficient to support standing.); Richardson, 418 U.S. at 176 (concluding that a “generalized
grievance” shared in common was insufficient injury); Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)
(remarking that it was “not sufficient that [a litigant] has merely a general interest common to all
members of the public”); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129–30 (1922) (“[T]he right,
possessed by every citizen, to require that the government be administered according to
law . . . does not entitle a private citizen to institute in the federal courts a suit.”).
108. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
109. “[T]he concrete injury requirement has . . . separation-of-powers significance . . . : To
permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance
with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from
the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed’ . . . . ‘Individual rights’. . . do not mean public rights that have
been legislatively pronounced to belong to each individual who forms part of the public.”
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577–78 (1992) (citation omitted).
110. Id. at 572–73.
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vindicate human liberty.111 That potential is better realized by permitting
states to prosecute public rights on behalf of their citizens than it is by
admitting that “the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate”
undifferentiated public rights leaves enforcement of such rights “to the
surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the [federal] political
process,”112 a process that the Court admits is “[s]low, cumbersome, and
unresponsive . . . .”113 Surely liberty is advanced by permitting states to
assert public rights in federal court to curb official lawlessness.
A neglected aspect of parens patriae doctrine suggests that a feature of
federal union is state authority to assert the undifferentiated public rights
of its citizens. States are entitled to “observance of the terms under which
[they] participate[] in the federal system,” and neither the states nor their
citizens may be “excluded from the benefits” of federal union.114 One need
not invoke antebellum conceptions of federal union as a compact among
the states to recognize the federal Union’s contractual aspects. “We the
people,” the ultimate sovereigns, created a federal government endowed
with limited and enumerated powers. By implication of that enumeration
and through the various state constitutional arrangements, the popular
sovereign has vested residual authority in their state governments,
including the authority to guard the people’s rights from federal invasion
should that ever be necessary. That does not mean that states have
authority to nullify federal power, as the antebellum southerners claimed;
it does mean that the states have a special right to insist that the federal
government conduct itself lawfully. That is surely one of the benefits of
federal union.
Nor does such a reading of parens patriae standing interfere with a
proper understanding of separation of powers. An objection to permitting
undifferentiated public rights to be vindicated in federal court is that it
would “permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the
Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty,” faithful execution
of the law.115 This objection necessarily assumes that faithful execution is
a matter of considerable executive discretion, and that judicial oversight
of that discretion encroaches upon the President’s authority. If correct, this
view would apply with equal force to suits brought at the behest of

111. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) (decribing federalism as “one
of the Constitution’s structural protections of liberty”); Rapaczynski, supra note 6, at 389
(“[B]ecause the states . . . break the national authorities’ monopoly on coercion . . . they constitute
the most fundamental bastion against a successful conversion of the federal government into a
vehicle of the worst kind of oppression.”).
112. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179.
113. Id.
114. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607–08 (1982).
115. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577.
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individuals and states as parens patriae. The objection may be recast,
however, in a form that distinguishes between citizen suits to enforce
public rights and such suits brought by states as parens patriae.116 If any
citizen may vindicate public rights, the risk of constant judicial supervision
of executive discretion is greatly increased, but if standing for such suits
is limited to states as parens patriae that risk is diminished.
Not only is the number of possible plaintiffs reduced to fifty, the
political process within each state will likely operate to restrain wholesale
challenges to the exercise of federal executive discretion. State attorneys
general are elected officials who must allocate their scarce resources
among a variety of issues that compete for official attention. An attorney
general who devotes inordinate attention to litigation of public rights in
federal court, thus slighting more local concerns, may encounter voter
discontent. It is thus reasonable to suppose that a general extension of
parens patriae standing to public rights will not produce a torrent of suits
broadly challenging the exercise of executive discretion. Only particularly
egregious executive violations of public rights are likely to trigger such
litigation.
Moreover, other justiciability doctrines will control excessively
exuberant state attorneys general. Some challenges are surely nonjusticiable political questions; others may not be ripe. The political
question doctrine may be an artful dodge, but it does exist as a brake upon
imprudent state assertions of undifferentiated public rights. Suppose that
John McCain is sworn in as President, and some six months later a state
attorney general challenges the validity of newly enacted federal
legislation on the ground that it lacks a presidential signature because John
McCain is not a natural-born citizen. The judiciary can answer the
question of whether a person born to two American citizens in the Panama
Canal Zone at a time when that territory was under the virtually complete
sovereignty of the United States is a natural-born citizen. But should a
court decide that McCain is not eligible to serve as President, prudence
would direct a court not to answer the question, and defer instead to the
judgment of the political branches. The instability that would result from
unwinding a long series of executive actions is too great.
The presence or absence of a procedural right is irrelevant to the ability
of states, as parens patriae, to assert the undifferentiated public rights of
their residents. Whether knowingly or not, EPA opens the door for such
challenges, regardless of congressional sanction. Such a conclusion
requires justification, however, for it assumes two tiers of cases or
controversies, one sharply confined and the other broadly inclusive.

116. Id.
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C. The Justification for Two Tiers of Article III Cases
or Controversies
The most challenging aspect of EPA is its creation of two different
conceptions of an Article III case or controversy. Because the federal
judicial power is confined to cases or controversies, one would think that
those terms would be uniformly applicable to all attempts to invoke federal
jurisdiction. Instead, EPA approves, for states as parens patriae, a relaxed
conception of a case or controversy while leaving in place the hard
standard of a case or controversy exemplified by Lujan. If the set of cases
or controversies is visualized as a sphere, individual litigants are confined
to the core of the sphere, while states enjoy its entirety. Within the core,
individuals and states in their proprietary capacity must demonstrate actual
injury or imminent threat of such injury, establish such injury directly
attributable to the defendant, and show a strong probability that judicial
action can redress the injury. In the mantle that surrounds the core, states
as parens patriae may assert quasi-sovereign injuries, which can consist
of pure public rights (though not all public rights) only weakly attributable
to the injury and posing merely the possibility that judicial action may
ameliorate the injury.
There are several justifications for this arrangement. A two-tiered
conception of Article III cases or controversies is consistent with
constitutional text, precedent, and structure. It is also justified by
prudential considerations related to constitutional structure.
Constitutional text does not mandate a uniform conception of a case or
controversy. Because federal jurisdiction spans a wide range of categories,
varying with party alignment and subject matter, the meaning of a case or
controversy may be as variable as the categories of federal jurisdiction.
The law of standing in existence prior to EPA supports this conclusion.117
An elastic conception of case or controversy as applied to standing is
not only consistent with constitutional structure, but enhances it. A
fundamental aspect of our constitutional architecture is the diffusion of
governmental power in order to prevent its accretion in the hands of a
single entity. That principle is the raison d’etre of federalism and
separation of powers within the federal government. The complete
elimination of the ability of any actor—citizen or government—to seek
judicial review of the validity of executive actions that inflict no
117. Even Lujan admitted that causation and redressability are relaxed with respect to
procedural rights. Id. at 572 n.7 (stating that the holder of a procedural right may “assert that right
without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy”). The understanding
of parens patriae standing before EPA recognized that states could assert diffuse
non-individualized injury in fact. See Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607 (stating that as parens
patriae a state may assert the “health and well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents
in general”).
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individualized injury grants to the executive a limited but unfettered power
to violate law. However narrow that power may be, its very existence is an
affront to constitutional structure. It is no objection to say that judicial
enforcement of undifferentiated public rights infringes upon the
President’s duty to execute the laws, for that duty is a responsibility to
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”118 An illimitable
executive power to violate the law when the effects are evenly distributed
among the populace is not consistent with that command.
A prudent conception of the case or controversy requirement would
permit states as parens patriae to assert claims of undifferentiated public
rights. Inherent in congressional lawmaking is “a certain degree of
discretion action”119 vested in the executive branch. While it is untenable
to permit any citizen challenge of the exercise of that discretion without
showings of personal injury and redressability, it is prudent to permit
states, as partners in the federal system whose officials are accountable to
their citizens, to challenge executive discretion that inflicts
undifferentiated injury.
The problem is agency costs, a concept familiar to economists and
students of the modern public corporation. Agency costs arise from
differing objectives of the principal and the agent.120 In a public
corporation the objectives of shareholders (the principals) may be different
from the objectives of corporate management (the agents).121 For example,
management may act to build a larger empire, or reap personal benefits
from corporate philanthropy, while shareholders prefer wealth
maximization.122 One way to minimize agency costs is to increase the
ability of principals to oversee the agents’ actions.123 Transposed to
government, the federal executive is the agent of the people, but if the
people are stripped of any ability to obtain judicial review of executive
action, their oversight capabilities are reduced to the franchise. Voting is
important, of course, but the exercise of the franchise is always a choice
among prospective agents (who may all share the same disposition to
exercise their discretion unlawfully so long as there is no judicial
oversight). Moreover, rarely do voters choose their agents on the basis of
a single trait and, when they do, that trait is not likely to be the agent’s

118. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
119. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120. See, e.g., Agency Costs, in Economics A-Z, Economist.com, http://www.economist.com/
research/Economics/alphabetic.cfm?LETTER=A#agencycosts.
121. Id. See also Robert J. Rhee, Tort Arbitrage, 60 FLA. L. REV. 125, 152 (2008) (noting that
“the theory of agency costs suggests that agents do not have the same personal stake in the outcome
of a corporate decision as would a shareholder”).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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propensity to take unlawful action that leaves nobody with personalized
injury. By contrast, permitting states to raise in federal court claims of
public rights on behalf of their citizens increases the degree of oversight
of executive action and thus diminishes agency costs without strangling
lawful and desirable executive discretion. Principals retain agents because
they cannot, or are unwilling, to do the job, so agents must have the
freedom to perform efficiently. The challenge in controlling agency costs
is to minimize those costs without stifling the efficiency gains produced
by agency. An appropriate balance would permit states as parens patriae
to seek judicial oversight of executive agents.
Of course, the use of states and the federal judiciary as the vehicle for
monitoring executive discretion injects another dimension of agency costs,
for both state attorneys general and federal judges are agents of the people.
There is no perfect control of agency costs, but if the alternative to using
these agents is to abandon all means (short of the ballot box) of controlling
such executive misbehavior, one must reckon these agency costs to be
worthwhile. First, there are fifty state electorates that may use the
franchise to control state actors who misuse (or fail to use) the parens
patriae power, instead of a national electorate acting through the Electoral
College to choose a President every four years. Second, while the agency
costs of a life-tenured and unelected federal judiciary are not
inconsequential, the historical verdict suggests that the judiciary is a
reasonable check on executive malfeasance, regardless of whatever agency
costs may be the product of a judiciary that ignores popular interpretations
of law.124
Finally, parens patriae suits to vindicate undifferentiated public rights
will be limited by the requirement that a state assert a quasi-sovereign
interest. Not every claim of executive or legislative wrongdoing will
implicate a quasi-sovereign interest. Consider Watergate: After members
of President Nixon’s reelection campaign burglarized the Democratic
National Committee’s headquarters, the President and many of his
principal advisors conspired to obstruct the investigation of the crime.125
After political pressure forced the President to appoint an independent
prosecutor,126 several of the President’s associates were convicted of

124. Of course, the general response to this observation is that the judiciary is intended to
ignore, or even act contrary to, popular interpretations of law. Judicial independence is a special
form of agency cost that presumes that the agents know better than the principal what is best for
the principal. To the extent that popular will is at odds with constitutional or statutory guarantees,
this assumption is correct.
125. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 687 & n.3 (1974).
126. Id. at 687–88.
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crimes.127 Of course, the federal government had a quintessentially
sovereign interest in these prosecutions, but could any state, as parens
patriae, have sought to obtain a judicial declaration of the President’s
violation of law? While every American suffered the injury of witnessing
a criminal conspiracy to obstruct justice take place in the Oval Office,
what concrete injury to the health and well-being of the citizenry
occurred? EPA implicitly relied upon scientific evidence that carbon
dioxide emissions contribute to global warming in concluding that the
undifferentiated threat of climate change attributable to global warming
was sufficiently concrete (in the sense that it was inevitable) to support
parens patriae standing. In the case of Watergate, however, the spectacle
of a criminal conspiracy led by the President posed no inevitable injury to
the health or well-being of any state’s citizens. Other political and legal
machinery corrected a distasteful and illegal act.
Consider the facts of Schlesinger.128 Some members of Congress held
reserve commissions in the armed forces of the United States, apparently
in violation of Article I’s prohibition against a member of Congress
“holding any [o]ffice under the United States” while serving in
Congress.129 Although all Americans suffer the indignity of observing the
flouting of this provision, what concrete injury upon their health or
well-being do they suffer? An alliance of military and civil authority is
dangerous to liberty, and ought not be countenanced by people committed
to democratic institutions, but does a concrete injury result? EPA does not
provide good authority for that proposition. The inevitability of personal
and economic harm from global warming gave enough solidity to this
undifferentiated public injury to support parens patriae standing.
Schlesinger lacks any such solidity; at best there is an intangible threat of
some future injury, the nature of which is uncertain.
Accordingly, there is little reason to think that parens patriae actions
to vindicate undifferentiated public rights will produce a torrent of suits.
The development of separation of powers doctrine suggests that it is a
flexible tool, to be used to prevent either encroachment by one branch
upon the powers of another or aggrandizement of one branch by its ultra
vires exercise of power. The requirement of concrete injury to a state’s
127. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 389 F. Supp. 917 (1975) (denying motion for new
trial following conviction).
128. See supra notes 105, 107 and accompanying text.
129. See U.S. CONST . art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“[N]o Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”). There is historical
support for the proposition that this clause requires military officers to surrender their commissions
in order to serve in Congress. For example, during the Civil War, Frank Blair, Jr., served as a Major
General in the U.S. Army, but resigned his commission in order to sit in the House of
Representatives, and was reappointed to that rank by President Lincoln when he left the House. See
DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 468–69, 483, 496 (1995).
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quasi-sovereign injury, albeit diluted by EPA, preserves that understanding
of separated powers.
IV. CONCLUSION
Massachusetts v. EPA created two tiers of an Article III case or
controversy for purposes of ascertaining standing to sue in federal court.
Although the case held that when Congress has created a procedural right
a state may bring suit, as parens patriae, to vindicate a federal right that
implicates the health or well-being of the state’s citizens without the
quantum of proof of injury in fact, causation, or redressability that would
be necessary with an individual plaintiff. The Court’s interpretation of
injury in fact will be particularly critical to subsequent understanding of
EPA. Whether or not Congress has created a procedural right, states as
parens patriae may assert undifferentiated public rights in federal court,
so long as they can establish a quasi-sovereign interest. To do so, they
need only plead and prove that the injury suffered is (1) either a concrete
injury to the health and well-being of their citizens, or (2) implicates the
terms under which it participates in the federal union. A concrete injury
may take a variety of somewhat plastic forms in connection with a quasisovereign injury. The quasi-sovereign injury that supported Massachusetts’
standing in EPA was neither actual nor immediate, but it was inevitable.
Moreover, the fact that the magnitude of the prospective injury is
speculative posed no barrier to establishing concrete injury to the state’s
quasi-sovereign interest in the health or well-being of its citizens.
This relaxation of the injury in fact requirement for parens patriae suits
that seek to vindicate undifferentiated public rights advances federalism
principles and does not violate the principle of separated powers. A
foundational element of federalism is the diffusion of power between
states and the federal government, with the prospect of the states acting as
a check upon unlawful or unwarranted federal power. Vesting the states
with limited authority to challenge the validity of federal action that harms
everyone (but no one in a sufficiently personal fashion to support
individual standing) buttresses that key element of federalism. Nor will
this dilution of injury in fact for parens patriae suits offend separation of
powers principles. Unlike individual suits to prosecute undifferentiated
public rights, the state actors who must decide whether to institute parens
patriae litigation are constrained by substantial fetters of political
accountability. Moreover, there are significant prudential barriers to such
suits. Finally, not every claim of undifferentiated public rights will present
either a concrete injury (as understood after EPA) or implicate a
quasi-sovereign interest. The net result of EPA is a salutary breach of the
hitherto impenetrable Maginot Line of standing that prevented judicial
consideration of executive lawlessness which inflicts universal but
impersonal harm on the citizens of our nation.
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